Abstract-This paper studies the problem of secure communication over two-layer networks, where a source is connected to a set of relays via direct edges. These relays are then connected to m destinations, such that each destination has direct connections to a subset of relays. In multiple unicast traffic, the source wishes to transmit independent information to each of the m destinations. This work studies the secure capacity region for this traffic over the defined two-layer networks, under the assumption of perfect information theoretic security criterion from an adversary who can access any K edges of the network. In particular, the secure capacity region is characterized when either K = 1 or m = 3. Moreover, conditions sufficient to characterize the secure capacity region are provided for arbitrary values of K and m.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, a large portion of exchanged data over communication networks is inherently sensitive and private (e.g., banking, professional, health). This data is of the order of terabytes per seconds and hence it calls for efficient mechanisms for secure communication. Moreover, with the advent of quantum computing, we can no longer rely on cryptographic-based secure communication schemes. Thus, information theoretic security, which ensures that no information is leaked about the message exchanged between two or more trusted parties, is today more important than ever. However, information theoretic optimal schemes and secure capacity characterization of arbitrary networks with arbitrary traffic are not known.
In this paper, we consider wireline networks modeled as directed graphs of unit capacity edges. In particular, we consider two-layer networks, where a source is connected to a set of relays via direct edges. These relays are then connected to m destinations, such that each destination is directly connected to a subset of relays. An example of such network with 6 relays and 3 destinations is shown in Fig. 1 . A passive external adversary, Eve, wishes to learn the data exchanged over this network. Eve has unbounded computational capabilities (e.g., a quantum computer), but limited network presence, namely, she can wiretap at most K edges of her choice. Over such a network, information theoretic security seeks to design transmission schemes that are unconditionally/perfectly secure, i.e., no matter which K edges Eve wiretaps, she does not learn anything about the content of the exchanged information.
In [1] , we recently designed an information theoretic secure communication scheme for two-layer networks, and showed that this scheme is indeed capacity achieving when m = 2. In particular, in [1] , we showed that for m = 2 it is sufficient to 'separate' the network into two disjoint sub-networks, where: (i) one subnetwork is used to multicast the keys to the m = 2 destinations, and (ii) the other subnetwork is used to transmit the encoded messages. However, in [1] we also pointed out that such a 'separation' scheme is not optimal when m > 2. For instance, for the network in Fig. 1 , we can achieve higher rates if we jointly use the network to transmit keys and encoded messages, i.e., multicasting the keys using a portion of the network, and sending the encoded messages using the remaining portion of the network does not achieve the capacity. In this paper, we build on our recent result in [1] and extend it. In particular, we first characterize the secure rate region achieved by the scheme proposed in [1] , and show that this scheme is capacity achieving for the following additional scenarios: (i) networks where m = 3 and K is arbitrary; (ii) networks where K = 1 and m is arbitrary; (iii) networks where K and m are arbitrary, but the network has some special structure in terms of minimum cut. Related Work. Shannon [2] proved that the one-time pad can provide perfect information theoretic security with pre-shared keys. For degraded point-to-point channels, Wyner [3] showed that information theoretic security can be achieved without pre-shared keys. With feedback, Maurer [4] proved that secure communication is possible, even when the adversary has a channel of better quality than the legitimate receiver.
Multicast traffic over networks of unit capacity edges was analyzed by Cai et al. in [5] , and followed by several other works, such as [6] , [7] . In [5] , the information theoretic secure capacity was characterized for networks where a source multi-casts the exact same information to a number of destinations in the presence of a passive external adversary eavesdropping any K edges of her choice. In [8] , Cui et al. studied networks with non-uniform edge capacities when the adversary is allowed to eavesdrop only some specific subsets of edges.
In [9] , we recently studied security over multiple unicast traffic, and we characterized the secure capacity region for networks with single source and m = 2 destinations. In [9] , for networks with arbitrary number of destinations, we also provided a suboptimal scheme which first multicasts the keys to the m destinations and then transmits the encoded messages. Paper Organization. In Section II we define two-layer networks and formulate the problem of characterizing the secure capacity region. In Section III, we review the secure scheme proposed in [1] and in Section IV, we characterize the secure rate region achieved by it. In Section V and Section VI, we prove that the scheme achieves the capacity when K = 1 and m = 3, respectively. In Section VI, we also provide sufficient conditions that ensure that the scheme is capacity achieving for two-layer networks with arbitrary values of K and m.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Notation: Calligraphic letters indicate sets; ∅ is the empty set and |A| is the cardinality of A; for two sets A 1 , A 2 , A 1 ⊆ A 2 indicates that A 1 is a subset of A 2 , A 1 ∪A 2 indicates the union of A 1 and A 2 , A 1 A 2 indicates the disjoint union of A 1 and A 2 , A 1 ∩ A 2 is the intersection of A 1 and A 2 and A 1 \A 2 is the set of elements that belong to A 1 but not to A 2 ; [n] is the set of integers from 1 to n ≥ 1; [x] + := max{0, x} for x ∈ R; for a matrix A, A T is its transpose; dim(A) is the dimension of the rowspace spanned by rows of A; for two vector subspaces V 1 and V 2 , we let
A two-layer network consists of one source S that wishes to communicate with m destinations, by hopping information through one layer of t relays. As such, a two-layer network is parameterized by: (i) the integer t, which denotes the number of relays in the first layer; (ii) the integer m, which indicates the number of destinations in the second layer; (iii) m sets
, where M i contains the indexes of the relays connected to destination D i . An example of a two-layer network is shown in Fig. 1 , for which t = 6,
We represent a two-layer wireline network with a directed acyclic graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. The edges represent orthogonal communication links, which are interference-free. In particular, these links are discrete noiseless memoryless channels over a common alphabet F q , i.e., they are of unit capacity over a q-ary alphabet. If an edge e ∈ E connects a node i to a node j, we refer to node i as the tail and to node j as the head of e, i.e., tail(e) = i and head(e) = j. For each node v ∈ V, we define I(v) as the set of all incoming edges of node v and O(v) as the set of all outgoing edges of node v.
Source S has a message
. These m messages are assumed to be independent. Thus, the network consists of multiple unicast traffic, where m unicast sessions take place simultaneously and share the network resources. In particular, each message W i , i ∈ [m], is of qary entropy rate R i . A passive external eavesdropper Eve is also present and can wiretap any K edges of her choice. The symbol transmitted over n channel uses on e ∈ E is denoted as Y n e . In addition, for E t ⊆ E we define Y n Et = {Y n e : e ∈ E t }. We assume that S has infinite sources of randomness Θ, while the other nodes in the network do not have any randomness.
Over this network, we are interested in finding all possible feasible m-tuples (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R m ) such that each D i , i ∈ [m], reliably decodes the message W i (with zero error) and Eve receives no information about the content of the messages. In particular, we are interested in ensuring perfect information theoretic secure communication, and we aim at characterizing the secure capacity region, which is next formally defined.
Definition 1.
A rate m-tuple (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R m ) is said to be securely achievable if there exist a block length n and a set of encoding functions f e , ∀e ∈ E, with
such that each destination D i can reliably decode the message
The secure capacity region is the closure of all such feasible rate m-tuples.
Definition 2.
A cut is an edge set E A ⊆ E, which separates the source S from a set of destinations
In a network with unit capacity edges, the minimum cut or min-cut is a cut that has the minimum number of edges.
With M A we denote the cardinality of a min-cut between the source and the set of destinations
It is worth noting that for two-layer networks, we have that M A = |∪ i∈A M i |. For notational convenience, in the remainder of the paper, we let
III. SECURE TRANSMISSIONS SCHEME We here review the secure transmission scheme for twolayer networks that we recently proposed in [1] . In Section IV, we will then derive its achieved rate region. The source S encodes the message packets with K random packets and transmits these packets on its outgoing edges to the t relays. We can write the received symbols at the t relays as
. . .
where
, and (iv) V is a Vandermonde matrix of dimension t × K. The matrix V is chosen for security purposes, i.e., any set of K rows of V are linearly independent and hence, no matter which K rows (i.e., edges) Eve wiretaps, she will learn nothing about the messages W [m] .
Each relay i ∈ [t] will then forward the received symbol Y i in (1) to the destinations to which it is connected. As such, each destination will observe a subset of symbols from {Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . , Y t } (depending on which of the t relays it is connected to). Finally, destination D i , i ∈ [m] selects a decoding vector and performs the inner product with
In particular, this decoding vector is chosen such that it has two characteristics: (1) it is in the left null space of V , i.e., in the right null space of V T ; this ensures that each destination is able to cancel out the random packets (encoded with the message packets); (2) it has zeros in the positions corresponding to the relays it is not connected to; this ensures that each destination uses only the symbols that it actually observes. In other words, all the decoding vectors that D i can choose belong to the null space of the matrix V i defined as
where C i is a matrix of dimensiont × t, witht being the number of relays to which D i is not connected to. In particular, each row of C i has all zeros except a one in the position corresponding to a relay to which D i is not connected to. For instance, with reference to the network in Fig. 1 , we have 
IV. ACHIEVED SECURE RATE REGION
In this section, we derive the rate region achieved by the secure scheme described in Section III. In particular, we have the following lemma, whose proof is in Appendix A. Lemma 1. The secure rate region achieved by the proposed scheme is given by
where N i is the right null space of the matrix V i in (2).
In the remainder of this paper, we prove that the secure rate region in (3) is indeed the secure capacity when there are m = 3 destinations (and arbitrary K), and when the eavesdropper wiretaps any K = 1 edge of her choice (and arbitrary m).
V. SECURE CAPACITY FOR K = 1
In this section, we consider the case when Eve wiretaps any K = 1 edge of her choice, and characterize the secure capacity region. In particular, we prove the following theorem. Theorem 2. For the two-layer network when Eve wiretaps any K = 1 edge of her choice, the secure capacity region is
with C A being the number of connected components in an undirected graph where: (i) there are |A| nodes, i.e., one for each i ∈ A; (ii) an edge between node i and node j, {i, j} ∈ A, i = j, exists if M i ∩ M j = ∅.
A. Outer Bound
Our outer bound on the secure capacity region from [9] is
We now show that the outer bound in (5) can be equivalently written as in (4) . i=1 V i and we can write
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows by applying (5) for each set V i , i ∈ [C A ], (ii) the equality in (b) follows since, by construction, M i ∩ M j = ∅ for all i ∈ V x and j ∈ V y with x = y, and (iii) the equality in (c) follows since A = C A i=1 V i . Thus, (5) implies (4). Moreover, since C A ≥ 1, (4) implies (5) . This shows that the rate region in Theorem 2 is an outer bound on the secure capacity region when K = 1.
We now consider an example of a two-layer network and show how the upper bound derived above applies to it. Example: Let A = {2, 3, 4}, and assume that M 1 = {1, 2}, M 2 = {3, 4}, M 3 = {4, 5, 6} and M 4 = {7, 8}. Then, we construct an undirected graph such that: (i) it has 3 nodes since |A| = 3 and (ii) has an edge between node 2 and node 3 since M 2 ∩ M 3 = {4} = ∅. It therefore follows that this graph has C A = 2 components. In particular, we have
where V 1 = {2, 3} and V 2 = {4}.
B. Computing Achievable Rate Region
We here show that the rate region in Theorem 2 is achieved by the scheme described in Section III. In particular, we show that,
where recall that dim i∈A N i is the secure rate performance of our proposed scheme in Section III (see Lemma 1) . The condition in (7) can be equivalently written as ∀A ⊆ [m],
where the equality in (a) follows by using the property of the orthogonal complement, and V i , i ∈ A is defined in (2) . In other words, we next show that
Towards this end, we would like to count the number of linearly independent vectors x ∈ F t q that belong to (∩ i∈A V i ). We note that, by our construction: (i) V T consists of one row of t ones, and (ii) C i has zeros in the positions indexed by M i . Hence, if a vector belongs to V i , then all its components indexed by M i have to be the same, i.e., either they are all zeros, or they are all equal to a multiple of one. Thus, we have q choices to fill these positions indexed by M i . Let F i be the collection of all these vectors with equal components in M i . Now, consider V j with j ∈ A and j = i. By using the same logic as above, if a vector belongs to V j , then all its components indexed by M j have to be the same (and we have q of such vectors, which are collected inside F j ). We now need to count the number of these vectors so that they also belong to V i . Towards this end, we consider two cases: 1) Case 1:
In this case, there is no overlap in the elements indexed by M i and M j and hence we can select all the available q vectors in F j ; 2) Case 2: M i ∩ M j = ∅. In this case, there is some overlap in the elements indexed by M i and M j . Thus, since we have already fixed the elements indexed by M i , we do not have any choice for the elements indexed by M j (since all the elements have to be the same). By iterating the same reasoning as above for all i ∈ A, we conclude that we can fill all the positions indexed by ∪ i∈A M i of a vector x ∈ F t q and make sure that x ∈ (∩ i∈A V i ) in q C A ways. This is because, there are C A connected components, and for each of these components we have only q choices to fill the corresponding positions in the vector x (i.e., the positions that correspond to the relays to which at least one of the destinations inside that component is connected). Once we fix any position inside a component, in fact all the other positions inside that component have to be the same, and thus we have no more freedom in choosing the other positions. Moreover, the remaining t − M A positions of x can be filled with any value in F q and for this we have q t−M A possible choices. Therefore, the number of vectors x ∈ F t q that belong to (∩ i∈A V i ) is at most q C A +t−M A , which implies
This proves that the secure scheme in Section III achieves the rate region in Theorem 2. We now illustrate our method of identifying vectors that belong to ∩ i∈A V i through an example.
With this, we can construct V i , i ∈ [4], as described in (2), where V T consists of one row of 8 ones. For instance, we will have 
We want to count the number of vectors x ∈ F 8 q such that x ∈ V 2 ∩ V 3 ∩ V 4 . We use the following iterative procedure: 1) For x to belong to V 2 its elements in the 3rd and 4th positions have to be the same since M 2 = {3, 4}. Thus, we have q choices for a vector x to belong to V 2 . 2) For x to belong to V 3 , its elements in the 4th, 5th and 6th positions have to be the same since M 3 = {4, 5, 6}. However, the element in the 4th position has already been fixed in selecting vectors that belong to V 2 . Thus, there is no further choice other than just repeating the value of the 4th position in the 5th and 6th positions. 3) For x to belong to V 4 , its elements in the 7th and 8th positions have to be the same since M 4 = {7, 8}. Since in the previous two steps, we have not filled yet the elements in these positions, then we have q possible ways to fill the elements in the 7th and 8th positions. 4) Moreover, we can fill the elements in the 1st and 2nd
positions of x in q 2 possible ways.
With the above procedure we get that dim ∩ i∈{2,3,4} V i = 4, which is equal to the upper bound that we computed in (6) for the same example.
VI. SECURE CAPACITY FOR m = 3
In this section, we consider the case m = 3, and we characterize the secure capacity region through the theorem below.
Theorem 3. For a two-layer network with m = 3 destinations, the secure capacity region is given by
Clearly the rate region in (9) is an outer bound on the secure capacity region [9] and can be equivalently written as
where P is a disjoint partition of A. We will now show that for every
We prove (10) by considering three different cases.
Case 1: |A| = 1, i.e., A = {i}. For this case, V i in (2) has K + t − M {i} rows. In particular, all these rows are linearly independent since: (i) the rows of V T are linearly independent as V is a Vandermonde matrix, (ii) C i is full row rank by construction, and (iii) any linear combination of the rows of V T will have a weight of at least t − K + 1 (from the Vandermonde property), whereas any linear combination of the rows of C i will have a weight of at most t − M {i} ≤ t − K. It therefore follows that, ∀i ∈ [3], we have that
where the first equality follows by using the property of the orthogonal complement. Thus, (10) is satisfied. Case 2: |A| = 2, i.e., A = {i, j}. For this case, ∀(i, j) ∈ [3] 2 , i = j, we have that
where the second equality follows by using dim(N i ) derived in Case 1. Thus, we need to compute dim(N i ∩N j ). Note that, by definition, N i ∩ N j is the right null space of
where the last equality follows by removing one copy of the common rows in C i and C j , i.e., C ij is a matrix of dimension (t − M ∩{i,j} ) × t, with all unique rows. Using a similar argument as in Case 1 (i.e., any vector in the span of V T has a minimum weight of t − K + 1), the number of linearly independent rows of V ij is min{t, t − M ∩{i,j} + K}. Thus,
where the first equality follows from the rank-nullity theorem. We can now write dim(
Thus, the condition in (10) is satisfied. Case 3: A = {1, 2, 3}. For this case, we will compute dim(
Towards this end, we would like to compute the number of linearly independent vectors x ∈ F t q that belong to V 1 ∩V 2 ∩V 3 . We start by noting that, similar to the case K = 1, we have t − M {1,2,3} degrees of freedom to fill the positions of x corresponding to [t] \ ∪ i∈ [3] M i . We now select a permutation (i, j, k) of (1, 2, 3) . In order for x to belong to V i , the positions of x corresponding to M i can be filled with K degrees of freedom. This is because: (i) C i in (2) has zeros in the positions specified by M i , and (ii) V T has K rows. Then, to fill the positions of x specified by M j so that x ∈ V j , we have at most [K − M ∩{i,j} ] + degrees of freedom. This is because the positions of x corresponding to M i ∩ M j have already
+ degrees of freedom. This is because, the positions of x corresponding to
In Appendix B, we further tighten dim(V 1 ∩V 2 ∩V 3 ) above and show that, when substituted in (12), it satisfies the condition in (10) . This proves that the scheme described in Section III securely achieves the rate region in Theorem 3. We now conclude this section by providing sufficient conditions for which the secure scheme in Section III is capacity achieving. In particular, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The scheme in Section III achieves the secure capacity region of a two-layer network with aribitrary values of K and m whenever
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows by extending to arbitrary values of m the iterative algorithm proposed for Case 3 above to fill the vector x so that x ∈ V 1 ∩ V 2 . . . ∩ V m , and (ii) the equality in (b) follows since
By using the property of the orthogonal complement, we obtain dim( i∈A N i ) ≥ M A − K, which satisfies the condition in ( We let T be a matrix of dimension (
, contains R i decoding vectors that belong to N i . Mathematically, we have
where d 
We propose an iterative algorithm to select R i , i ∈ [m] decoding vectors from N i such that T in (13) has indeed a full row rank. The performance of the proposed algorithm is provided in the following lemma. Proof. We use an iterative algorithm that, for any permutation π = {π (1), . . . , π(m)} of [m], allows to select R π(i) vectors from N π(i) (with R π(i) being defined in (14)) so that all the selected m i=1 R i vectors are linearly independent. We next illustrate the main steps of the proposed algorithm.
from N π (1) . Note that one possible choice for this consists of selecting the basis of the subspace N π(1) . 2) Next we would like to select independent vectors from N π(2) that are also independent of the R π(1) vectors that we selected in the previous step. Towards this end, we note that a basis of the subspace N π(1) + N π(2) is a subset of the union between a basis of N π(1) and a basis of N π (2) . Therefore, we can keep selecting vectors from a basis of N π(2) as long as we select an independent vector. Since there are dim(N π(1) + N π(2) ) independent vectors in a basis of N π(1) + N π(2) , then we can select
independent vectors from N π(2) that are also independent of the R π(1) vectors that we selected in the previous step. 3) Similar to the above step, we now would like to select independent vectors from N π(3) that are also independent of the R π(1) + R π(2) vectors that we selected in the previous two steps. Towards this end, we note that a basis of the subspace N π(1) +N π(2) +N π(3) is a subset of the union between a basis of N π(1) + N π(2) and a basis of N π(3) . Therefore, we can keep selecting vectors from a basis of N π(3) as long as we select an independent vector. Since there are dim(
independent vectors from N π(3) that are also independent of the R π(1) + R π(2) vectors that we selected in the previous two steps. 4) We keep using the iterative procedure above for all the elements in π, and we end up with Remark 2. The result in Lemma 5 implies that rate m-tuple (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R m ), with R i , i ∈ [m] being defined in (14), can be securely achieved by our proposed scheme.
We now leverage the result in Lemma 5 to prove Lemma 1. We start by noting that the rate region in (3) can be expressed as the following polyhedron:
where f (A) := dim i∈A N i . We now prove the following lemma, which states that this function f (·) is a non-decreasing and submodular function over subsets of [m] .
is a non-decreasing and submodular function.
which proves that the function f (·) is non-decreasing. For proving submodularity, consider two subsets C, D ⊆ [m]. Then, we have
which proves that the function f (·) is submodular.
Since f (·) is a submodular function, then the polyhedron defined in (15) is the polymatroid associated with f (·). Moreover, since f (·) is also non-decreasing, then the corner points of the polymatroid in (15) can be found as follows [10, Corollary 44.3a] . Consider a permutation π = {π(1), . . . , π(m)} of [m]. Then, by letting S = {π(1), . . . , π( )} for 1 ≤ ≤ m, we get that the corner points of the polymatroid in (15) can be written as R π( ) = f (S ) − f (S −1 ).
Note that by using f (A) = dim i∈A N i , the above corner points are precisely those in (14) in Lemma 5. Since each rate m-tuple (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R m ), with R i , i ∈ [m] being defined in (14), can be securely achieved by our proposed scheme, it follows that the secure rate region in (3) can also be achieved by our scheme. This concludes the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B ANALYSIS OF THE DIMENSION OF
From our analysis, we have obtained
We now further consider two cases. Case 3A: There exist (i, j) ∈ [3] 2 , i = j, such that M ∩{i,j} ≥ K. In this case, with the permutation (i, j, k), the expression in (16) becomes
+ +t−M {1,2,3}
= t − M {1,2,3} + max{2K − M ∩{k,{i,j}} , K}. 
